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I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a Final Reconsideration Order on Remand of the Idaho Public 
Utilities Commission ("Idaho PUC" or "Commission"). Grouse Creek Wind Park, LLC, and 
Grouse Creek Wind Park II, LLC ("Grouse Creek") appeal the determination of the Idaho PUC 
that Grouse Creek was not entitled to avoided cost rates in effect prior to December 14, 2010, 
and the Commission's disapproval of Grouse Creek's two Firm Energy Sales Agreements 
("PESA"). 
This case is about the Commission's authority to determine whether Grouse Creek, as a 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURP A") qualifying facility ("QF"), is entitled 
to a previously effective, higher avoided cost rate pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation in 
the state of Idaho and the Commission's authority to determine the proper avoided cost rates, 
including whether such rates are in the public interest and just and reasonable to the customers of 
Idaho Power. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
1. Background.1 
On November 5, 2010, Idaho Power Company ("Idaho Power"), Avista Corporation, and 
PacifiCorp, d\b\a Rocky Mountain Power filed a Joint Petition requesting that the Commission 
initiate an investigation to address various avoided cost issues related to the Commission's 
implementation of PURP A. R. p. 222. "A voided costs" are those costs which a public utility 
1 The relevant Course of Proceedings Background is sufficiently set forth in the Idaho PUC' s 
Order No. 32257. R. pp. 222-23. 
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would otherwise incur for electric power, whether that power was purchased from another source 
or generated by the utility itself. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6). R. p. 222. 
While the Commission pursued its investigation, the utilities also moved the Commission 
to "lower the published avoided cost rate eligibility cap from 10 aMW to 100 kW [to] be 
effective immediately .... " R. p. 222 (quoting Joint Petition at 7). Under PURPA regulations 
issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), the Commission must 
"publish" avoided cost rates for small QFs with a design capacity of 100 kilowatts ("kW") or 
less. R. p. 222. However, the Commission has the discretion to set the published avoided cost 
rate at a higher capacity amount-commonly referred to as the "eligibility cap." 18 C.F.R. § 
292.304(c)(l-2). R. p. 222. For small QFs below the eligibility cap, the avoided cost is 
determined using a surrogate avoided resource ("SAR") methodology based upon the cost of a 
natural gas-fired combined cycle combustion turbine. When a QF project is larger than the 
published eligibility cap, the avoided cost rate for the project must be individually negotiated by 
the QF and the utility using the Integrated Resource Plan ("IRP") methodology. Id. 
The purpose of utilizing the IRP methodology for large QF projects is to more precisely 
value the energy being delivered. Id. The IRP methodology recognizes the individual 
generation characteristics of each project by assessing when the QF is capable of delivering its 
resources against when the utility is most in need of such resources. Id. The resultant pricing is 
reflective of the value of QF energy to the utility. Id. Utilization of the IRP methodology does 
not negate the requirement under PURP A that the utility purchase the QF energy. Id. 
On December 3, 2010, the Commission issued Order No. 32131 declining the utilities' 
motion to immediately reduce the published avoided cost rate eligibility cap from 10 average 
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megawatts ("aMW") to 100 kW. Id. However, the Order did notify parties that the 
Commission's decision regarding the motion to reduce the published avoided cost eligibility cap 
would become effective on December 14, 2010. R. pp. 222-23. 
Based upon the record in the GNR-E-10-04 case, the Commission subsequently found 
that a "convincing case has been made to temporarily reduce the eligibility cap for published 
avoided cost rates from 10 aMW to 100 kW for wind and solar only while the Commission 
further investigates" other avoided cost issues. R. p. 223 (emphasis in original). On 
reconsideration, the Commission affirmed its decision to temporarily reduce the eligibility cap 
for published avoided cost rates from 10 aMW to 100 kW. R. p. 223. No party appealed the 
Commission's final order on reconsideration. R. p. 255. Thus, the eligibility cap for the 
published avoided cost rate for wind and solar QF projects was set at 100 kW effective 
December 14, 2010. R. p. 223 
2. The Grouse Creek Agreements. 
On December 28, 2010, Idaho Power and Grouse Creek entered into the respective 
agreements at issue in this case. R. p. 223. On December 29, 2010, each agreement was filed 
with the Commission for its review. R. pp. 10-7 4; R. pp. 7 5-13 9. Under Idaho's implementation 
of PURP A, those signed contracts do not become effective, and the rates therein do not lock in, 
until the Idaho PUC approves them. See A. W Brown Co. v. Idaho Power Co., 121 Idaho 812, 
814, 828 P.2d 841, 843 (1992) ("The [Idaho PUC] established a rule that power purchase 
contracts, once negotiated, be presented to the [Idaho PUC] for approval."). 
On February 24, 2011, the Commission issued a Notice of the Applications and set a 
deadline of March 24, 2011, for the submission of written comments in support or opposition to 
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the Application. R. pp. 140-45. Comments were filed by Commission Staff, R. pp. 146-53, by 
Grouse Creek, R. pp. 158-83, and by Idaho Power, R. pp. 184-98. 
On June 8, 2011, the Idaho PUC rejected Grouse Creek's two FESAs in Order No. 
32257. R. pp. 221-31. On June 29, 2011, Grouse Creek filed a Petition for Reconsideration of 
the Commission's Order No. 32257. R. pp. 233-40. On July 6, 2011, Idaho Power filed an 
Answer to Grouse Creek's Petition for Reconsideration, R. pp. 242-51. On July 27, 2011, the 
Commission, in Order No. 32299, upheld its previous decision, rejecting Grouse Creek's 
agreements. R. pp. 252-66. Grouse Creek then filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court on 
September 7, 2011. R. pp. 267-72. 
On October 4, 2011, FERC issued a Declaratory Order in the Cedar Creek Wind, LLC 
("Cedar Creek") case, finding in its Declaratory Order, that the Idaho PUC's decision not to 
approve Cedar Creek's FESAs was inconsistent with PURP A and FERC regulations. Cedar 
Creek Wind, LLC, 137 FERC if 61,006 (Oct. 4, 2011) ("Cedar Creek Declaratory Order"). 
In response to the Cedar Creek Declaratory Order, on November 4, 2011, Idaho Power, 
Grouse Creek, and the Idaho PUC filed a Stipulated Motion to suspend the appeal and remand 
the case to the Idaho PUC. R. pp. 285-89. On January 5, 2012, the Idaho PUC in Order No. 
32430 set a schedule for briefing and oral arguments to reconsider its denial of the Grouse Creek 
FESAs in light of FER C's Cedar Creek Declaratory Order. R. pp. 292-95. On February 6, 2012, 
Idaho Power filed its Memorandum on Remand, R. pp. 297-310, as well as an additional factual 
submission containing the Affidavit of Randy Allphin and numerous documents evidencing the 
communications between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power. Ex. pp. 281-532. Also on February 6, 
2012, Commission Staff filed a Legal Brief on the remand. R. pp. 311-17. Grouse Creek filed a 
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Reply Brief on February 27, 2012. R. pp. 318-45. The Commission heard oral argument from 
the parties on March 7, 2012. Tr. pp. 1-44. 
On September 7, 2012, the Commission issued its Final Reconsideration Order on 
Remand, Order No. 32635, which, after examining the additional legal and factual submissions 
of the parties and considering FERC's Cedar Creek Declaratory Order, again declined to approve 
the Grouse Creek FESAs. R. pp. 346-63. Based upon its examination of the record, and the 
facts in the case, the Commission found, among other things, that: Idaho Power did not refuse to 
sign a contract; that no conduct by Idaho Power unnecessarily delayed or impeded Grouse 
Creek's ability to enter into its agreements; that the evidence and the conduct of the parties do 
not support that a legally enforceable obligation was formed; and that a legally enforceable 
obligation did not arise prior to December 14, 2010, because material terms to the agreements 
were still incomplete on that date. R. pp. 360-61. 
Grouse Creek filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to this Court on October 19, 2012. R. 
pp. 364-69. The Idaho PUC settled the record for appeal in Order No. 32720 on January 18, 
2013. R. pp. 393-97. 
C. Statement of the Facts. 
Idaho Power had numerous and frequent contacts and communications with Grouse 
Creek regarding several iterations of its proposed projects over the course of most of 2010. Ex. 
pp. 282-88 (referencing Attachments to the Affidavit of Randy Allphin, R. pp. 290-532). Idaho 
Power negotiated and proceeded with Grouse Creek in good faith negotiations and attempts to 
move Grouse Creek's proposed projects to final agreements pursuant to its PURPA obligations. 
Id. Any delay was not attributable to a refusal by Idaho Power to negotiate, nor any refusal by 
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Idaho Power to execute a contract. R. pp. 360-61. Any delay that occurred was attributable to 
the fact that Grouse Creek changed the configuration of its project numerous times, did not agree 
to previously approved standard contract terms and conditions until December 9, 2010, did not 
provide final and complete information about its projects' configuration until December 15, 
2010, and did not commit itself to sell its output to Idaho Power until December 21, 2010. Ex. 
pp. 282-88. 
The course of dealings and many of the written communications between Grouse Creek 
and Idaho Power are set forth in the Affidavit of Randy Allphin and its attachments. Ex. pp. 
281-532. The totality of these communications demonstrate that Idaho Power proceeded in good 
faith and fair dealings with Grouse Creek through many iterations of its proposed projects and 
did not unreasonably delay the projects. Id. Idaho Power was first contacted by Grouse Creek in 
late February 2010. Ex. p. 282. The initial Grouse Creek project was a single 150 megawatt 
("MW") project spread across 4,000 acres of private and public land located in northern Utah. 
R. p. 65 (Grouse Creek Comments at 8). Discussions between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power 
on the single 150 MW project continued until April 2010 when Grouse Creek informed Idaho 
Power that it was now considering a single 65 MW project instead of the previously discussed 
150 MW project. Ex. pp. 282-83. Because this proposed project was a QF larger than 10 aMW, 
Idaho Power prepared pricing for the proposed project based upon its !RP-based pricing 
methodology, pursuant to Commission requirements. Ex. p. 283. Idaho Power analyzed this 
proposal pursuant to the requirements of the !RP-based methodology and provided Grouse Creek 
with the results, including a proposed price. Id., Attachment No. 4. 
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Three months later, Grouse Creek once again changed the configuration of its proposed 
project and informed Idaho Power on July 14, 2011, that it "intended to reduce its overall 
footprint and wished to discuss power sales contracts for two single 10 aMW projects, instead of 
a large 65 MW project." R. p. 170 (quoting Grouse Creek Comments at 13). Idaho Power 
records indicate that initially Grouse Creek was anticipating two projects, one with a 30 MW 
nameplate capacity and the other with a 21 MW nameplate capacity. Ex. pp. 282-85. Consistent 
with its existing processes, Idaho Power began drafting power purchase agreements ("PP A") for 
these two projects. Id. During negotiations, Grouse Creek continued to object to certain terms in 
the PPAs related to Idaho Power's standard security deposit requirements. R. p. 172 (Grouse 
Creek Comments at 15). In addition, and consistent with prudent utility business practices, 
Idaho Power required confirmation from Grouse Creek that, because its proposed projects were 
located off Idaho Power's system, the projects would need to provide sufficient evidence of the 
proper arrangements to deliver its output to Idaho Power's system. Ex. p. 283. As Grouse Creek 
is an off-system QF, Idaho Power's obligation to contract with the projects pursuant to PURPA 
does not arise until the projects demonstrate a firm delivery to a point on Idaho Power's system. 
Discussions continued between the parties and, during August, communications were 
exchanged regarding clarification as to the project configuration, the number of proposed 
projects, accuracy of the data, and the requirements of 10 aMW and one-mile separation. Ex. p. 
284. On October 1, 2010, Grouse Creek sent formal correspondence through legal representation 
for now two projects, Grouse Creek Wind and Grouse Creek Wind IL Ex. p. 284. The letter 
requests PP As, provides information, objects to the posting of security required by the contracts, 
changes the project from 30 MW to 21 MW, and requests revision of the transmission service 
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request ("TSR") from 30 MW to 21 MW, among other things. Id. On November 1, 2010, Idaho 
Power sent formal correspondence to counsel for Grouse Creek responding to the October 1, 
2010, letter and pointing out several of the open items remaining with the various proposed 
projects. Id. Also forwarded with these letters were copies of required Network Resource 
Integration Study Agreements, required Transmission Capacity Application Questionnaires, and 
Draft Firm Energy Sales Agreements. Id. On November 4, 2010, Idaho Power notified the 
projects that the submitted TSRs were rejected because the information provided by the project 
did not sync up with the project's transmission requests on Bonneville Power Administration's 
("BPA") system. Ex. pp. 284-85. The communication asks for updated transmission 
information from the project that was needed to proceed with the TSRs, and advised of the need 
for ancillary services. Id. On November 24, 2010, Idaho Power sent correspondence confirming 
a prior letter and meeting between the project and Idaho Power and summarizing the current 
status of negotiations as to some of the previously contested terms and conditions. Id. 
On December 2, 2010, Grouse Creek sent marked-up versions of draft PP As previously 
sent by Idaho Power. Ex. p. 285; R. p. 174 (Grouse Creek Comments at 17). These mark-ups 
were the first time Idaho Power was definitively informed of the projects' size and configuration 
(i.e., two 21 MW projects). Negotiations continued between the parties and, on December 6, 
2010, Idaho Power received a revised Transmission Questionnaire from the projects containing 
corrected information for resubmission of the TSRs, which was forwarded to Idaho Power 
transmission on the same day. Ex. p. 285. On December 7, 2010, Idaho Power forwarded 
updated draft PP As for the projects, incorporating the information provided by the projects, and 
working toward executable versions of the FESAs. Ex. pp. 285-86. This communication also 
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notifies the projects of missing information from the projects, necessary to confirm the required 
one-mile separation between the projects and necessary to complete the draft FESAs. Id. Also 
on December 7, 2010, Idaho Power began the internal review process on the draft FESAs, even 
though they were not yet complete, nor accepted by the projects, so as not to unduly impede the 
ultimate execution of the FESAs once accepted by the projects since the December 14, 2010, 
date previously set by the Commission as the effective date for the reduction in the published 
rate eligibility cap to 100 kW was drawing near. Id. 
On December 9, 2010, Grouse Creek sent communication confirming the projects' 
agreement to the security provisions of the contract and requesting a change in the Scheduled 
First Energy Dates as well as the Scheduled Operation Dates. Id. On December 14, 2010, Idaho 
Power sent communications to Grouse Creek requesting that the projects provide missing 
information required for completion of the draft FESAs. Ex. p. 286. This information included 
naming the proper transmission entity, as previous communications from the projects had 
indicated at different times both BPA and PacifiCorp. Id.; Tr. pp. 28-29. This communication 
also requested, again, that the project provide a complete location designation, which is 
necessary to establish the proper one-mile separation and legal description of the projects' 
location. Id. 
On December 15, 2010, Idaho Power sent an e-mail confirming Idaho Power's receipt 
and acceptance of the projects' revised First Energy and Scheduled Operation dates, and 
indicating the same would be incorporated into the final draft FESAs. Ex. pp. 286-87. This 
communication also reiterates Idaho Power's December 14, 2010, request from the previous day 
for additional required information regarding the transmitting entity and completion of the 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF IDAHO POWER COMPANY - 9 
location description for the projects. Id. The projects were informed that this information was 
required to continue processing the proposed agreements. Id. 
On December 15, 2010, Idaho Power requested Grouse Creek's confirmation that the 
Scheduled First Energy and Scheduled Operation Dates, as well as the location description for 
the projects, were correct. Ex. p. 287. This information was confirmed on December 16, 2010, 
by the projects. Id. On that same day, Idaho Power provided executable copies of the FESAs 
that were picked up from Idaho Power's office by the projects' counsel. Id. From December 16 
through December 21, 2010, Grouse Creek reviewed the draft FESAs, and on December 21, 
2011, Grouse Creek executed the PPAs and sent them via overnight mail to Idaho Power. Id. 
Idaho Power executed the PPAs on December 28, 2010, and filed them at the Commission the 
next day. Id. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Although Idaho Power addresses Grouse Creek's designated Issues on Appeal in its 
Respondent's Brief, the issues in this matter may more succinctly be stated as follows: 
1. Did the Idaho Public Utilities Commission properly apply Idaho law m its 
determination that Grouse Creek did not establish entitlement to the avoided cost rates in effect 
prior to December 14, 201 O? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standards of review for orders of the Idaho PUC are well settled. Under the Idaho 
Constitution, this Court has only limited jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commission. 
Idaho Const., Art. V § 9; A. W Brown Company v. Idaho Power Company, 121 Idaho 812, 815, 
828 P .2d 841, 844 (1992). "The review on appeal shall not be extended further than to determine 
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whether the commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of 
whether the order appealed from violates any right of the appellant under the constitution of the 
United States or the state ofldaho." Idaho Code§ 61-629. 
With regard to findings of fact, if the Commission's findings are supported by 
substantial, competent evidence, this Court must affirm those findings, Industrial Customers of 
Idaho Power v. Idaho PUC, 134 Idaho 285, 288, 1 P.3d 786, 789 (2000), even if this Court 
would have made a different choice had the matter been before it de nova. Hulet v. Idaho PUC, 
138 Idaho 476, 478, 65 P.3d 498, 500 (2003). Substantial, competent evidence is defined as 
more than a mere scintilla, but something less than the weight of the evidence. Industrial 
Customers, 134 Idaho at 292-93, 1 P .3d at 793-94. "This Court will not displace the agency's 
choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the Court may justifiably arrive at a 
different conclusion if the matter were before it de nova." Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC, 
128 Idaho 609, 618, 91 7 P .2d 7 66, 77 5 (1996)("the PacifiCorp case")( citation omitted). 
On questions of law, review is limited to the determination of whether the Commission 
has regularly pursued its authority. A. W. Brown, 121 Idaho at 815, 828 P.2d at 844; Hulet, 138 
Idaho at 478, 65 P.3d at 500. The Commission's order or ruling will not be set aside unless it 
has failed to follow the law or has abused its discretion. Application of Boise Water Corp., 82 
Idaho 81, 86, 349 P.2d 711, 713 (1960)(citing cases). 
The Commission's order must contain the reasoning behind its conclusions to sufficiently 
allow the reviewing court to determine that the Commission did not act arbitrarily. Rosebud, 128 
Idaho at 618. "What is essential are sufficient findings to permit the reviewing court to 
determine that the IPUC has not acted arbitrarily." Id., 128 Idaho at 624 (citations omitted). 
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IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The factual, "as-applied" determination of when a PURP A QF establishes the right to a 
particular avoided cost rate pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation in the state of Idaho is a 
determination that lies exclusively with the state authority, the Idaho PUC, and not with FERC. 
As such, the legality and reasonableness of the Idaho PUC's determination in Grouse Creek's 
case is a question proper for this Court's review, and not for FERC. 
The Commission and this Court have long recognized, and approved as consistent with 
state and federal law, the application in the state of Idaho of FERC requirements with regard to 
determining a QF's eligibility for a certain avoided cost rate pursuant to a legally enforceable 
obligation. The Idaho PUC has applied the legally enforceable obligation requirements, 
confirmed as valid and lawful by this Court, to the facts presented by Grouse Creek's proposed 
QF projects. The Commission found that Grouse Creek did not establish entitlement to the 
avoided cost rates that were in effect for QFs prior to December 14, 2010, pursuant to the state of 
Idaho's implementation of PURPA. Further, the Commission found it to be contrary to the 
public interest of the people of the state ofldaho for Grouse Creek's proposed projects to receive 
the avoided cost rates in effect prior to December 14, 2010. The Idaho PUC's findings of fact 
are supported by substantial, competent evidence. The Commission regularly pursued its lawful 
authority in applying the regulatory scheme for the implementation of PURP A in the state of 
Idaho to Grouse Creek's proposed projects. Accordingly, the final order of the Idaho PUC 
should be affirmed by this Court. 
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V.ARGUMENT 
A. The Determination as to When a Legally Enforceable Obligation Is Incurred Is 
Within the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the State. 
The factual, "as-applied" determination of when a PURP A QF establishes the right to a 
particular avoided cost rate pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation in the state of Idaho is a 
determination that lies exclusively with the state authority and the Idaho PUC, not with FERC. 
As such, the legality and reasonableness of the Idaho PUC's determination in Grouse Creek's 
case is a question proper for this Court's review, and not for FERC, or the federal courts. 
Consequently, Grouse Creek's reliance upon the declaratory orders issued by FERC in Cedar 
Creek Wind, LLC, 137 FERC if 61,006 (Oct. 4, 2011), Rainbow Ranch Wind, LLC, 139 FERC if 
61,077 (April 30, 2012), Murphy Flat Power, LLC, 141 FERC if 61,145 (Nov. 20, 2012), and 
Grouse Creek Wind Park, LLC, 142 FERC if 61,187 (March 15, 2013) (collectively hereinafter, 
"FERC's Declaratory Orders") is without merit. 
1. Legally Enforceable Obligation. 
Congress enacted PURP A to encourage the development of co generation and small 
power production facilities, and directed FERC to promulgate regulations to further this goal. 16 
U.S.C. § 824a-3(a); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750-51, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 
(1982). PURP A also requires that the state regulatory authorities, such as the Idaho PUC, 
implement FERC regulations. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f). In FERC v. Mississippi, the U.S. Supreme 
Court found that a state may comply with its obligation to implement PURP A and FERC 
regulations "by issuing regulations, by resolving disputes on a case-by-case basis, or by taking 
any other action reasonably designed to give effect to FERC's rules." 456 U.S. at 751, 102 S.Ct. 
2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532. FERC has further stated that states may fulfill the requirement to 
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implement its rules by "either 1) through the enactment of laws or regulations at the State level; 
2) by application on a case-by-case basis by the State regulatory authority, or nonregulated 
utility, of the rules adopted by the Commission [FERC]; or 3) by any other action reasonably 
designed to implement the Commission's [FERC's] rules." Policy Statement Regarding the 
Commission's Enforcement Role Under Section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
of 1978, 23 FERC P 61304, 61644, 1983 WL 39627 (May 31, 1983). 
Legally enforceable obligation ("LEO") in the context of PURP A is a phrase found in 
FERC's regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 292.304, Rates for Purchases, in subsections (b)(5) and (d)(2). 
The portion relevant to the issues in this proceeding states: 
( d) Purchases "as available" or pursuant to a legally 
enforceable obligation. Each qualifying facility shall have the 
option either: 
(1) To provide energy as the qualifying facility determines 
such energy to be available for such purchases, in which case the 
rates for such purchases shall be based on the purchasing utility's 
avoided costs calculated at the time of delivery; or 
(2) To provide energy or capacity pursuant to a legally 
enforceable obligation for the delivery of energy or capacity over a 
specified term, in which case the rates for such purchases shall, at 
the option of the qualifying facility exercised prior to the beginning 
of the specified term, be based on either: 
(i) The avoided costs calculated at the time of delivery; or 
(ii) The avoided costs calculated at the time the obligation is 
incurred. 
18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d). Upon enacting the above regulation, FERC stated, "Use of the term 
'legally enforceable obligation' is intended to prevent a utility from circumventing the 
requirement that provides capacity credit for an eligible qualifying facility merely by refusing to 
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enter into a contract with the qualifying facility." Small Power Production and Cogeneration 
Facilities; Regulations Implementing Section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978, 45 Fed.Reg. 12,214, 12,224 (Feb. 25, 1980). "This provision allows QFs to provide 
energy to utilities either by entering into a contract or pursuant to a LEO." Power Resource 
Group, Inc., v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, 422 F.3d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 2005)(citing 
Small Power Production and Cogeneration Facilities; Regulations Implementing Section 210 of 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 45 Fed.Reg. 12,214, 12,224 (Feb. 25, 1980)). 
The Idaho PUC has implemented the provisions of§ 292.304(d) with regard to Idaho 
Power by making available the two pricing options referred to in § 292.304(d) at the election of 
the QF. First, a QF may select to sell "as available" pursuant to Idaho Power's Tariff Schedule 
86, Cogeneration and Small Power Production Non-Firm Energy. IPUC No. 29, Tariff No. 101, 
Sheet No. 86-1 through 86-7 (Mar. 1, 2008). This pricing option is available for QFs selecting to 
receive rates based upon the utility's avoided cost at the time of delivery. Second, for QFs that 
select to have pricing established for a specified term according to the utility's avoided cost at 
the time of contracting, or when the obligation is incurred, the Commission has authorized the 
use of two avoided cost pricing methodologies. A surrogate avoided resource, or SAR, 
methodology is used for small projects below the published rate eligibility cap, currently set at 
100 kW for wind and solar QFs and 10 aMW for all other QFs. For QFs that are larger than the 
published rate eligibility cap, an avoided cost methodology based upon the utility's IRP is used 
to establish the starting point for negotiating the avoided cost rate for each specific project. The 
Commission reviews each QF PP A, and Commission approval of each agreement is required 
prior to such agreement being effective. 
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2. "As-Applied" vs. "As-Implemented." 
It is well settled that "[i]t is up to the States, not this Commission [FERC], to determine 
the specific parameters of individual QF power purchase agreements, including the date at which 
a legally enforceable obligation is incurred under State law." W Penn Power Co., 71 FERC if 
61, 153, 61,495 (May 8, 1995). FERC even quotes this exact passage itself in its recent 
declaratory order regarding Grouse Creek. Grouse Creek Wind, 142 FERC if 61, 187 at P 41 
(March 15, 2013). 
An important distinction that defines jurisdictionally the respective authority of the 
federal government, through FERC and the federal courts, and the state government, through the 
Idaho PUC and the Idaho Supreme Court, is the distinction between "as-applied" and "as-
implemented." FERC has no authority over "as-applied" claims under PURP A. This is the 
exclusive province of the state. FERC has only limited authority as to "as-implemented" claims 
that must be brought to the federal district court to be given effect. The Idaho PUC expressly 
recognized the proper weight and authority of FERC's Declaratory Orders in its application of 
legally enforceable obligation analysis to Grouse Creek: 
It is important to note that a declaratory order issued by FERC is 
not legally binding on this Commission. A declaratory order "that 
does no more than announce the [FERC's] interpretation of the 
PURP A or one of the agency's implementing regulations is of no 
legal moment unless and until a district court adopts that 
interpretation when called upon to enforce PURP A." Niagra 
Mohawk Power Corp., v. FERC, 117 F.3d 1485, 1488, 326 
U.S.App.D.C. 135, 138 (1997). 
["]Unlike the declaratory order of a court, which does 
fix the rights of the parties, this [FERC] Declaratory 
Order merely advised the parties of the [FERC's] 
position. It was much like a memorandum of law 
prepared by the FERC staff in anticipation of a 
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possible enforcement action; the only difference is 
that the [FERC] itself formally used the document as 
its own statement of position. While such knowledge 
of the FERC's position might affect the conduct of 
the parties, the Declaratory Order is legally 
ineffectual apart from its ability to persuade (or to 
command the deference of) a [district] court that 
might later have been called upon to interpret the Act 
and the agency's regulations in an [sic] private 
enforcement action .... " 
R. pp. 356-57 (quoting Industrial Cogenerators v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1231, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
This distinction is well illustrated and discussed in a series of cases from Texas, similar to 
the case now brought by Grouse Creek and before this Court. Power Resource Group, Inc., v. 
Public Utility Commission of Texas, 73 S.W.3d 354 (Tex.2002); Power Resource Group, Inc., v. 
Klein, No. A-03-CA-762-H, slip op. at 12 (W.D.Tex. Feb. 18, 2004); Power Resource Group, 
Inc., v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, 422 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2005) cert. denied, 547 U.S. 
1020, 126 S.Ct. 1583, 164 L.Ed.2d 301 (Mar. 20, 2006). Power Resource Group ("PRG"), a 
PURPA QF, challenged Texas's application and implementation of PURPA in both state and 
federal court. Power Resource, 422 F.3d at 232-33. After purchase negotiations between PRG 
and the utility failed, PRG sought to compel the utility to purchase power pursuant to a legally 
enforceable obligation. Id. at 233. The Public Utility Commission of Texas ("Texas PUC") 
determined that because its rules implementing PURP A provide for a legally enforceable 
obligation only if a facility is within ninety days of delivering power, the utility had no 
obligation to purchase power from PRG. Id. PRG sought relief in Texas state courts, which 
denied its request to overturn the Texas PUC's decision. Id. PRG then brought suit in federal 
district court, which held that it had jurisdiction only to determine whether the Texas PUC had 
fully implemented PURPA, and dismissed PRG's remaining, "as-applied" claims. Id. Finding 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF IDAHO POWER COMPANY - 17 
that the Texas PUC did, in fact, fully implement PURP A, including providing for the option of a 
legally enforceable obligation, the federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Texas PUC and the utility. Id. PRG appealed to the 5th Circuit, which affirmed the district 
court's decision. Id. 
"An implementation claim involves a contention that the state agency . . . has failed to 
implement a lawful implementation plan under 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f) of PURPA, whereas an 
'as-applied' claim involves a contention that the state agency's ... implementation plan is 
unlawful, as it applied to or affects an individual petitioner." Power Resource, 422 F.3d at 235 
(quoting the federal district court)( citations omitted). "Federal courts may not hear 'as applied' 
claims, because jurisdiction over such claims is reserved to the state courts." Id. (citing Indust. 
Cogenerators v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1231, 1234 (D.C.Cir. 1995); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Mass. Dep't 
of Puc. Utils., 941 F.Supp. 233, 236 (D.Mass.1996); Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Ga. Power Co., 
643 F.Supp. 1345, 1374 (N.D.Ga.1986)). The district court in Power Resource determined that 
the only issue properly before the federal court was whether the Texas PUC failed to implement 
PURP A, and that all other "as-applied" claims would stand as determined by the Texas state 
courts. Id. at 231. Upon its review affirming the district court, the 5th Circuit concluded, 
"defining the parameters for creating a LEO is left to the states and their regulatory agencies." 
Id. at 239. 
PRG failed to show that PURPA and the FERC regulations 
mandate that all QFs, including unbuilt ones, must be able to create 
a LEO at any time. To the contrary, states must provide for legally 
enforceable obligations as distinct from contractual obligations, but 
"[i]t is up to the States, not [FERC], to determine the specific 
parameters of individual QF power purchase agreements, including 
the date at which a legally enforceable obligation is incurred under 
State law." W Penn Power Co., 71 F.E.R.C. if 61,153, 61,495 
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Id. at 238. 
(May 8, 1995). West Penn and its progeny Jersey Central Power 
& Light Co., 73 F.E.R.C. if 61,092, 61,297 (Oct. 17, 1995), and 
Metropolitan Edison Co., 72 F.E.R.C. if 61,015, 61,050 (July 6, 
1995), supports the proposition that the FERC regulations grant the 
states discretion in setting specific parameters for LEOs. 
The Idaho PUC has applied a regulatory scheme that provides for both the formation of 
contractual obligations and also a distinct LEO. Grouse Creek contends that the Commission has 
limited, improperly, the determination regarding LEO to only the terms of the contract. 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 22-24. This is clearly not the case. The Commission, in this case, directly 
addressed this distinction in Order No. 32635, "At the outset, we note that this Commission did 
not and has never made a determination that the creation of a legally enforceable obligation only 
occurs when a QF and a utility enter into a written and signed agreement." R. p. 355 (emphasis 
in original). "We clearly did not make a finding that the creation of a legally enforceable 
obligation only occurs when a QF and a utility enter into a written and signed agreement." R. p. 
356 (emphasis in original). 
The entire premise of Grouse Creek's case is flawed. Grouse Creek's first designated 
issue on appeal states, "Whether the Idaho PUC's decision ... is an improper and illegal 
implementation of PURPA." Appellant's Brief, p. 17 (emphasis added). Implementation is the 
sole province and jurisdiction of federal courts, not the state, and not FERC-while application 
is sole province of the states, and proper for the Idaho PUC and the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Power Resource Group, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission a/Texas, 422 F.3d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 
2005) cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1020, 126 S.Ct. 1583, 164 L.Ed.2d 301 (Mar. 20, 2006). "Federal 
courts may not hear 'as applied' claims, because jurisdiction over such claims is reserved to the 
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state courts. Federal jurisdiction over implementation claims, the district court held, is 
exclusive." Id. (citations omitted)(affirming decision of district court to grant summary 
judgment in favor of PUC and utility). Grouse Creek bases nearly all of its arguments and 
justifications upon the series of FERC's Declaratory Orders (all of which deal with the same 
Commission determinations, issued on the same day, for several similarly situated QF projects 
and claims) that have no controlling or precedential value or effect upon this Court's 
determination as to the lawful application of the Commission's rules to the facts of this case 
pursuant to Idaho law. FERC has no authority or jurisdiction to make findings of fact with 
regard to the application of Idaho law to Grouse Creek, and where it has attempted to apply its 
interpretation of regulations to the facts of Grouse Creek, it has acted outside of its jurisdiction 
and authority. Moreover, as properly recognized by the Idaho PUC, until FERC's arguments and 
positions are considered and determined by a federal court, FERC's Declaratory Orders in these 
matters have no more authority or weight than a memorandum of law prepared by FERC staff, 
and is legally ineffectual. Industrial Cogenerators v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1231, 1235 (D.C.Cir. 
1995). Consequently, the relevant determination for this case is whether the Idaho PUC's 
determination that Grouse Creek was not entitled to a previously effective avoided cost rate was 
proper under Idaho law. 
B. The Commission's Application of Legally Enforceable Obligation is Proper Under 
Idaho Law. 
The Commission and this Court have long recognized, and approved as consistent with 
state and federal law, the implementation in the state ofldaho of FERC requirements with regard 
to determining a QF's eligibility for a certain avoided cost rate pursuant to a LEO. The Idaho 
PUC has applied the LEO requirements, confirmed as valid and lawful by this Court, to the facts 
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presented by Grouse Creek's proposed QF projects. The Commission found that Grouse Creek 
did not establish entitlement to the avoided cost rates that were in effect for QFs prior to 
December 14, 2010, pursuant to the state of Idaho's implementation of PURPA. Further, the 
Commission found it to be contrary to the public interest of the people of the state of Idaho for 
Grouse Creek's proposed projects to receive the avoided cost rates in effect prior to December 
14, 2010. The Idaho PUC's findings of fact are supported by substantial, competent evidence. 
The Commission regularly pursued its lawful authority in applying the regulatory scheme for the 
implementation of PURPA to Grouse Creek's proposed projects. Accordingly, the final order of 
the Idaho PUC should be affirmed by this Court. 
1. The Commission Properly Applied Idaho's Legally Enforceable Obligation 
Analysis to Grouse Creek. 
This Court has specifically affirmed, on at least two occasions, the Commission's 
application of the "meritorious complaint rule" employed by the Commission to determine on a 
case-by-case basis a QF's entitlement to a previously effective avoided cost rate pursuant to a 
LEO. A. W Brown Company, Inc., v. Idaho Power Company, 121 Idaho 812, 828 P .2d 841 
( 1992); Rosebud Enterprises, Inc., v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 131 Idaho 1, 951 P .2d 
521 (l 997)("Rosebud IF'). This rule is designed to address the express purpose of the existence 
of the legally enforceable obligation language from FERC's regulation: "Use of the term 
"legally enforceable obligation" is intended to prevent a utility from circumventing the 
requirement that provides capacity credit for an eligible qualifying facility merely by refusing to 
enter into a contract with the qualifying facility." Small Power Production and Cogeneration 
Facilities; Regulations Implementing Section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978, 45 Fed.Reg. 12,214, 12,224 (Feb. 25, 1980). 
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In A. W Brown, Brown, a PURP A QF, appealed an order of the Commission denying its 
request that the Commission order Idaho Power to purchase electricity from Brown at an earlier, 
superseded avoided cost rate. 121 Idaho at 813. What can be called the "meritorious complaint 
rule" is set forth in A. W Brown where the Commission had determined that: 
Id. at 814. 
the right to obtain the higher [previously effective] rates, would be 
extended only to those potential CSPP's[2J who, on or before April 
29, 1985, [effective date of the new rates] had either already signed 
a contract with Idaho Power to produce and sell energy or who had 
filed meritorious complaints with the PUC alleging that Idaho 
Power had declined to enter into a contract with them and that they 
were otherwise entitled to sell energy at the earlier [avoided cost] 
rates. In a subsequent order, the Commission held "that in order to 
be 'meritorious' a complainant must allege and prove (1) that the 
project was substantially mature to the extent that would justify 
finding that the developer was ready, willing and able to sign a 
contract and (2) that the developer had actively negotiated for a 
contract which, but for the reluctance of the utility, would have 
been executed." 
In A. W Brown, the Court first addressed "whether the Commission had authority to 
establish the requirement that, before a CSPP can lock-in a certain rate, there must be a signed 
contract to sell at that rate or a meritorious complaint alleging that the project was mature and 
that the developer had attempted, and failed, to negotiate a contract with the utility." Id. at 816. 
The court directly addressed the issue, "Does the PUC have authority, under federal and state 
law, to establish a regulatory scheme to determine whether and when a qualifying CSPP is 
entitled to a contract to sell energy at avoided cost rates?" Id. at 815. The court affirmed the 
2 CSPP stands for "cogenerators and small power producers," which is synonymous with 
referring to a PURP A QF. 
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Commission's authority, the application of the meritorious complaint rule, and the Commission's 
order. Id. at 818-819. 
Similar to A. W Brown, in Rosebud II, 3 a PURP A QF appealed an order of the 
Commission denying its request that the Commission order Idaho Power to purchase electricity 
at an earlier, superseded avoided cost rate. 131 Idaho at 3. This Court found that Rosebud did 
not obligate itself to sell power to the utility prior to the change in rates; that Rosebud did not 
have a legally enforceable obligation to sell power to the utility at the previously effective 
avoided cost rates; and rejected Rosebud's contention that federal law preempts the Idaho PUC 
from adopting a signed contract or complaint rule. Id. at 6. The Court stated: 
In A. W Brown Co., this Court ruled that IPUC has authority, under 
state and federal law, to require that before a developer can lock in 
a certain rate, there must be either a signed contract to sell at that 
rate or a meritorious complaint alleging that the project is mature 
and that the developer has attempted and failed to negotiate a 
contract with the utility; that is, there would be a contract but for 
the conduct of the utility. 121 Idaho at 816, 828 P.2d at 845. 
Rosebud has neither signed a contract nor established that Idaho 
Power will not negotiate with it. 
Rosebud II, 131 Idaho at 6. In addressing Rosebud's claim to federal preemption, this Court 
referred to its decision in the PacifiCorp case, 128 Idaho 609, 917 P.2d 766 (1996), stating: 
In [the PacifiCorp case] the Court ruled that "(a]ccording to the 
FERC, it is up to the State, not [FERC], to determine the specific 
parameters of individual (qualified facility] power purchase 
3 There are four Idaho Supreme Court cases entitled, Rosebud Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Public 
Utilities Commission Three of these cases dealt with substantially the same facts and issues, while the 
fourth, 128 Idaho 633, 917 P.2d 790, dealt with a non-related, utility rate base issue that was deemed 
moot and dismissed by the Court. For purposes of clarity, in Respondent-Intervenor Idaho Power's 
Respondent's Brief, the other three Rosebud cases will be referred to with the same nomenclature as that 
given to them by the Court in Rosebud 131 Idaho 1, 951 P.2d 521, as follows: Rosebud, 128 Idaho 624, 
917 P.2d 781 (l996)("Rosebud f'); Rosebud, 131 Idaho 1, 951 P.2d 521 (l998)("Rosebud If'); and 
Rosebud, 128 Idaho 609, 917 P.2d 766 (1996)("the PacifiCorp case"). Rosebud I and Rosebud II both 
deal with Idaho Power. 
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agreements, including the date at which a legally enforceable 
obligation is incurred under State law." In the PacifiCorp case, the 
Court noted that "Rosebud is not entitled to a lock-in of an avoided 
cost rate until it has entered into a legally enforceable and IPUC 
approved obligation for the delivery of energy and capacity." 
Rosebud JI, 131 Idaho at 6 (citations omitted). 
It is important to note that the main components of the meritorious complaint rule are 
directly tied to the directives of FERC's regulations regarding legally enforceable obligation. 
Idaho's rule addresses a determination as to whether the QF was ready, willing, and able to sign 
a contract with the utility. A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 814; Rosebud II, 131 Idaho at 6. This 
directly corresponds to FERC's guidance that "a QF, by committing itself to sell to an electric 
utility, also commits the electric utility to buy from the QF; these commitments result either in 
contracts or in non-contractual, but binding, legally enforceable obligations." Grouse Creek 
Wind, 142 FERC ii 61,187 at P 40 (2013)(quoting JD Wind 1, LLC, 129 FERC ii 61,148 at P 29 
(2009) (internal footnotes omitted))(citations omitted). Likewise, Idaho's rule also addresses a 
determination as to whether there was a refusal, or a delay, by the utility to contract and 
negotiate; that the developer had actively negotiated for a contract which, but for the reluctance 
of the utility, would have been executed. A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 814; Rosebud II, 131 Idaho 
at 6. This directly comports with FERC's own, and numerous, statements that the very purpose 
for the creation and existence of the phrase "legally enforceable obligation" is "to prevent a 
utility from circumventing the requirement that provides capacity credit for an eligible qualifying 
facility merely by refusing to enter into a contract with the qualifying facility." Small Power 
Production and Cogeneration Facilities; Regulations Implementing Section 210 of the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 45 Fed.Reg. 12,214, 12,224 (Feb. 25, 1980). 
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Grouse Creek cites to other Commission "grandfathering" cases, and argues that the 
Commission has unreasonably departed from the meritorious complaint rule. Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 27-31. This characterization is not correct. The Idaho PUC has always conducted the same 
analysis aimed at the two above-referenced core determinations of the meritorious complaint and 
legally enforceable obligation analysis: Did the QF obligate itself? Has there been a refusal or 
delay by the utility to contract? It is within the Commission's discretion and authority to require 
a "formal complaint" or some other means with which to analyze a legally enforceable 
obligation, or grandfathering claim. The Commission's determinations regarding grandfathering 
and legally enforceable obligations have always centered around the reasoned, case-by-case 
determination as to whether the QF has obligated itself, whether it has diligently pursued its 
project and negotiation of rate and contract, and whether the utility has refused to negotiate 
and/or contract or delayed the process. The Commission has not always required a "formal 
complaint" to be filed but has always conducted the same reasoned analysis in the context of an 
ongoing proceeding with full participation of both the QF parties and the utility, or utilities. 
Grouse Creek's characterization of the Idaho PUC changing or abandoning the "rule" as set forth 
in A. W Brown and Rosebud II is incorrect. 
An examination of the Commission's Order No. 32635, Final Reconsideration Order on 
Remand, (Sept. 7, 2012), R. pp. 346-62, clearly shows that the Commission properly recognized 
and identified its lawful discretion and authority, as well as this Court's precedent regarding 
application of legally enforceable obligation in Idaho; that the Commission made findings 
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record; and that the Commission provided 
sufficient reasoning and analysis behind the conclusions in its Order to allow this Court to 
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determine that it did not act arbitrarily-it regularly pursued its authority. The Idaho PUC 
recognized its discretion and authority under Idaho law in its analysis as to the application of a 
legally enforceable obligation to Grouse Creek. R. pp. 357-358. The Commission stated: 
The Idaho Commission has aggressively and proactively enforced 
PURP A, as evidenced by the abundance of QF projects that now 
operate in our State. We have a long history of recognizing two 
methods by which a QF can obtain an avoided cost rate in Idaho: 
(1) by entering into a signed contract with the utility; or (2) by 
filing a meritorious complaint alleging that "a legally enforceable 
obligation" has arisen and, but for the conduct of the utility, there 
would be a contract. Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC, 131 
Idaho 1, 951 P .2d 521 (1997); see also A. W Brown v. Idaho Power 
Company, 121 Idaho 812, 816, 828 P.2d 841, 845 (1992). Our 
application of this framework conforms with FERC's analysis of 
its standards. In JD Wind I, FERC succinctly stated: 
Thus, under our regulations, a QF has the option to 
commit itself to sell all or part of its electric output 
to an electric utility. While this may be done 
through a contract, if the electric utility refuses to 
sign a contract, the QF may seek state regulatory 
authority assistance to enforce the PURP A-imposed 
obligation on the electric utility to purchase form 
the QF, and a non-contractual, but still legally 
enforceable, obligation will be created pursuant to 
the state's implementation of PURPA. Accordingly, 
a QF, by committing itself to sell to an electric 
utility, also commits the electric utility to buy from 
the QF; these commitments result either in contracts 
or in non-contractual, but binding, legally 
enforceable obligations. 
JD Wind I, 129 FERC if 61,148 at 61,633 (Nov. 19, 
2009)(emphasis added). FERC determined that, regardless of 
whether the energy offered was firm or non-firm power, the QF 
was entitled to a legally enforceable obligation because the utility 
in JD Wind was refusing to enter into a contract with the OF. 
FERC reiterated its conclusions on reconsideration. JD Wind I, 
130 FERC if 61,127 at 61,628. The matter before this Commission 
involves two parties who voluntarily entered into PP As with 
negotiated terms and conditions. 
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R. pp. 357-358. The Commission went on to find that because Idaho Power and Grouse Creek in 
this case had negotiated and executed contractual agreements, and submitted the same to the 
Commission for its review, "A determination regarding whether and when a legally enforceable 
obligation arose - outside the specific contract terms - was wholly unnecessary." R. p. 358. 
Grouse Creek argues, based largely upon the FERC Declaratory Orders, that the 
Commission has limited, improperly, the determination regarding legally enforceable obligation 
to only the terms of the contract. As stated previously, this is clearly not the case. The 
Commission, in this case, directly addressed this distinction in Order No. 32635 stating, "At the 
outset, we note that this Commission did not and has never made a determination that the 
creation of a legally enforceable obligation only occurs when a QF and a utility enter into a 
written and signed agreement." R. p. 355 (emphasis in original). "We clearly did not make a 
finding that the creation of a legally enforceable obligation only occurs when a QF and a utility 
enter into a written and signed agreement." R. p. 356 (emphasis in original). 
Furthermore, in addressing Grouse Creek's claims upon reconsideration and remand that, 
based upon FERC's Declaratory Orders, Grouse Creek had a legally enforceable obligation prior 
to the December 14, 2010, change in the eligibility cap for published rates, the Commission went 
on to find that, "Even assuming, arguendo, that a legally enforceable obligation could somehow 
preempt the terms of subsequently written and signed Agreements between the parties, we find 
that a legally enforceable obligation did not exist prior to December 14, 2010." R. p. 359. The 
Commission then addressed Grouse Creek's contentions that a legally enforceable obligation to 
the previously effective avoided cost rates in place on November 8, 2010, the date Grouse Creek 
filed a complaint, and/or on December 9, 2010, the date Grouse Creek claimed that all material 
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contractual terms were established, were without merit. R. pp. 359-61. Based upon its 
examination of the record, and the facts in the case, the Commission found that: 
R. pp. 360-61. 
The utility did not refuse to sign a contract .... that no conduct by 
the utility unnecessarily delayed or impeded Grouse Creek's ability 
to enter into its Agreements. . . . that the evidence and the conduct 
of the parties do not support that a legally enforceable obligation 
was formed ... [and] that a legally enforceable obligation did not 
arise prior to December 14, 2010, because material terms to the 
Agreements were still incomplete on that date. 
Grouse Creek is highly critical of the Commissions' findings, claiming they are not 
supported by the substantial evidence standard. Appellant's Brief, pp. 32-39. Grouse Creek 
takes issue with the quantum of evidence, as it perceives the record, and takes the position that 
there was more evidence supporting Grouse Creek's arguments than there was supporting the 
Commission's findings that did not favor Grouse Creek. Id. Substantial evidence is defined as 
more than a scintilla, but something less than the weight of the evidence. Industrial Customers, 
134 Idaho at 292-93, 1 P .3d at 793-94. 
The Commission clearly states that it bases its findings upon the entirety of the evidence 
presented, and the conduct of parties. R. p. 360. In addition, the Commission's Final 
Reconsideration Order on Remand, R. pp. 346-63, contains a recitation of the documents filed in 
the case, a sample recitation of evidence, and the parties' respective positions, including their 
respective factual submissions, as well as specific reference to particular items in the record 
before it upon which it relied. Rosebud, 128 Idaho 609 at 624 (the PacifiCorp case) ("The 
IPUC's conclusion is preceded by a sample recitation of the evidence and the parties' respective 
positions. When viewed in context, the IPUC's conclusions indicate an implicit adoption of 
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Rosebud's position .... The IPUC's findings need not take any particular form so long as they 
fairly disclose the basic facts upon which the IPUC relies and support the ultimate 
conclusions."). 
Moreover, the transcript from the March 7, 2012, hearing conducted by the Commission 
in this matter shows that the Commission actively engaged in a dialogue with counsel regarding 
whether the material terms of the agreement were complete, or not, prior to December 14, 2010. 
Tr. pp. 26-32. The Commission had before it extensive comments filed by Idaho Power, R. pp. 
184-98, Commission Staff, R. pp. 146-53, and Grouse Creek, R. pp. 158-83. The Commission 
additionally had the lengthy factual submissions from both Grouse Creek and Idaho Power in the 
form of sworn affidavits with numerous documents attached. Idaho Power's Affidavit of Randy 
Allphin and attachments, Ex. pp. 281-582; Grouse Creek's Affidavit of Christine Mikell and 
attachments, Ex. pp. 3-280. 
The Commission's findings are based upon substantial, competent evidence in the record, 
and certainly upon more than a scintilla. It is not this Court, nor anyone's, responsibility to make 
any judgments upon the adequacy of the Commission's findings beyond that. The standard is 
clear: If the Commission's findings are based upon substantial, competent evidence, something 
more than a scintilla, then they must be affirmed, even if the Court would make a different 
determination were the matter before it de nova to review. Additionally, the Commission's final 
order clearly shows the reasoning behind its conclusions, sufficient for this Court to review and 
determine that the Commission acted within its lawful authority and discretion-a regular pursuit 
of its authority. The Commission properly applied Idaho's legally enforceable obligation 
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analysis to Grouse Creek. As such this Court should affirm the Commission's final order, and 
deny Grouse Creek's requested relief. 
2. The Commission Found Grouse Creek's Rates to be Contrary to the Public 
Interest. 
The Idaho PUC, in its review of the executed Grouse Creek FESAs, found that approval 
of the contracts would be contrary to the public interest and refused to approve them. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824a-3(b)(l)(requiring the rates for purchases from QFs by utilities be just and reasonable and 
in the public interest); R. pp. 229-30, June 8 Grouse Creek Order at 9-10 ("We find that it is not 
in the public interest to allow parties with contracts executed on or after December 14, 2010, to 
avail themselves of an eligibility cap that is no longer applicable."); R. p. 265, July 27 Grouse 
Creek Order at 14 ("[I]t is not in the public interest to allow parties with contracts executed on or 
after December 14, 2010, to avail themselves of an eligibility cap that is no longer available."); 
R. p. 361, September 7 Grouse Creek Order at 16 ("This Commission determined that it is not in 
the public interest to approve the Agreements. . . . For this Commission to approve a rate in 
excess of the utility's avoided cost would clearly be a violation of PURPA and FERC's 
implementing regulations.")(citation omitted). In addition, the Commission also subsequently 
found the methodology employed to derive the rates in Grouse Creek's FESAs to be unjust, 
unreasonable, contrary to PURPA, and not in the public interest. Case No. GNR-E-11-03, 
Interlocutory Order No. 32498, p. 2 (Mar. 22, 2012). 
Under PURP A's regulatory scheme, "state regulatory agencies have the authority to 
implement PURP A in reviewing and approving contracts for the sale of electricity." 
Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. State of Conn. Dept. of Pub. Util. Control, 53 l F.3d 183, 188 (2d. 
Cir. 2008) (citing Freehold Cogeneration Assocs., L.P. v. Bd. Of Reg. Comm 'rs of State of NJ., 
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44 F.3d 1178, 1192 (3d. Cir. 1995)); see also A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 816 ("The [Idaho] 
Commission, as part of its statutory duties, determines reasonable rates and investigates and 
reviews contracts. LC. §§ 61-502, -503.")(quoting Empire Lumber Co. v. Wash. Water Power 
Co., 114 Idaho 191, 193 (1988)); 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(c), (f). 
The Idaho PUC, in its role as the regulatory authority for implementing PURP A in the 
state of Idaho, has an independent obligation and duty to assure that all PURP A contracts entered 
into by Idaho Power are in the public interest. See Rosebud, 128 Idaho 609, at 613-14 (1996)(the 
PacifiCorp case) (The [Idaho] Commission, in acting pursuant to PURP A, must strike a balance 
between "the local public interest of a utility's electric consumers and the national public interest 
in development of alternative energy resources."); see also Ag. Prods. Corp. v. Utah Power & 
Light Co., 98 Idaho 23, 29, 557 P.3d 617, 623 (1976) ("Private contracts with utilities are 
regarded as entered into subject to reserved authority of the state to modify the contract in the 
public interest.") Additionally, the provisions providing for a legally enforceable obligation in 
determining the proper price for a QF must be read in conjunction with-and not to conflict-the 
other provisions of the statutory, or regulatory scheme. Moreland v. Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 690, 
152 P.3d 558 (2007)(citations omitted)(all parts of a statute should be given meaning and the 
Court will construe a statute so that effect is given to its provisions and no part is rendered 
superfluous or insignificant). Consequently, the Commission must retain the ability to give 
effect to the requirement in 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(l)(requiring the rates for purchases from QFs 
by utilities be just and reasonable and in the public interest) when considering the requirements 
of a legally enforceable obligation, used to determine rates for purchases in 18 C.F .R. § 292.304. 
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The duty of the Idaho PUC to ensure and protect the public interest even supersedes the 
state of Idaho's constitutional protection of private contracts. In the state of Idaho, contracts are 
afforded constitutional protection against interference from the state. Idaho Const., Art. I § 16. 
However, despite this constitutional protection, the Idaho PUC may annul, supersede, or reform 
the contracts of the public utilities it regulates in the public interest. Ag. Prods. Corp., 98 Idaho 
at 29 ("Interference with private contracts by the state regulation of rates is a valid exercise of 
the police power, and such regulation is not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against 
impairment of contractual obligations."). The Idaho PUC may interfere with the contracts of a 
public utility and disregard Idaho Constitutional protections of contract only to prevent an 
adverse affect to the public interest. Ag. Prods. Corp., 98 Idaho at 29. Grouse Creek's 
contention that the Commission's order should be reversed because its agreements contain 
agreed-to-rates authorized by 18 C.F .R. § 292.301 (b) is without merit. As stated herein, the 
Commission made specific findings that approval of Grouse Creek's agreements is contrary to 
the public interest and, further, subsequent proceedings additionally found the avoided cost rate 
methodologies employed to calculate the rates in Grouse Creek's agreements to be unjust 
unreasonable, and contrary to the public interest. Case No. GNR-E-11-03, Interlocutory Order 
No. 32498 at 2 (March 22, 2012). Grouse Creek's agreements were found to contain rates that 
exceed Idaho Power's avoided cost, which by definition are illegal as harmful to customers. 
Additionally, the wind resources proffered in Grouse Creek's agreements were not called for in 
Idaho Power's IRP, were not procured utilizing a request for proposal process, nor by any other 
means designed and required by the Commission to assure the least cost resource was acquired 
to meet the needs of Idaho Power's customers. As such, absent the must-purchase requirement 
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of PURP A, such agreement would not be executed by Idaho Power, nor approved by the 
Commission. 
While the Idaho PUC may not annul, supersede, or revise a PURP A contract during its 
term because such action may constitute utility-type regulation of a QF in violation of 18 C.F .R. 
§ 292.602(c)(l), the Idaho PUC may review and approve a PURPA contract at the time it is 
submitted by the parties for final approval, in furtherance of its state and federal duties to ensure 
that the agreement is consistent with the public interest. Crossroads Cogeneration Corp. v. 
Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 159 F.3d 129, 138 (3d.Cir.1998)("In other words, while 
PURP A allows the appropriate state regulatory agency to approve a power purchasing 
agreement, once such an agreement is approved, the state agency is not permitted to modify the 
terms of the agreement."). This duty and requirement exists, and the Idaho PU C's determination 
in this case was made, independently ofldaho's application oflegally enforceable obligation and 
the meritorious complaint analysis. Grouse Creek's FESAs were determined not to be in the 
public interest of the state ofldaho, and not to be in the interest ofldaho Power's customers. 
Grouse Creek's FESAs were subject to the Idaho PUC's public interest review of 
PURP A contracts upon submission to the Idaho PUC for approval. Each Grouse Creek FESA 
specifically states: 
This Agreement shall become finally effective upon the 
Commission's approval of all terms and provisions hereof without 
change or condition and declaration that all payments to be made 
to Seller hereunder shall be allowed as prudently incurred expenses 
for ratemaking purposes. 
R. pp. 52, 117, Idaho Power's Application, Attachment No. 1, Firm Energy Sales Agreement, at 
30, Case Nos. IPC-E-10-61 and IPC-E-10-62. The Idaho PUC's review of the FESAs has 
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meaning, and is not simply a formality. Upon the parties' submittal and Idaho PUC review, the 
Idaho PUC specifically found that approval of the Grouse Creek FESAs would be contrary to the 
public interests of the citizens of Idaho, even when weighed against the national public interest in 
developing alternative energy resources. R. pp. 229-30, June 8 Grouse Creek Order at 9-1 O; R. 
p. 265, July 27 Grouse Creek Order at 14 (citing Rosebud, 128 Idaho at 613)(the PacifiCorp 
case); R. p. 361, Sept 7 Grouse Creek Order at 16. The Idaho PUC acted within its discretion 
and obligation to protect the public interest by denying the Grouse Creek FESAs. 
Commission approval of the final contractual agreement, including the rates contained 
therein, is a required part of the Commission's implementation of PURP A in the state ofldaho, 
approved by this Court. Rosebud II, 131 Idaho 1, 6, 951 P .2d 521 (1998). FERC regulations 
mandate that state commissions approve standard rates for QFs under 100 kW but give states the 
discretion to approve standard rates for QFs over 100 kW. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(c). The United 
States Supreme Court has held that "the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may 
grant it upon conditions as it sees fit to impose." Frost v. Railroad Com. of State of Ca., 271 
U.S. 583, 593, 46 S.Ct. 605, 607, 70 L.Ed. 1101 (1926). The Court noted that the power is not 
unlimited-the state cannot impose conditions that require the relinquishment of constitutional 
rights. Id. at 593. However, QFs over 100 kW have no constitutional right to standard rates of 
which they can be deprived. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(c)(2) (states may approve standard rates 
for QFs over 100 kW). Therefore a state implementation that offers QFs a choice of project-
specific modeled rates, negotiated rates, or standard rates subject to final state commission 
approval does not deprive QFs of a constitutional right. Accordingly, a state commission may 
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elect to provide QFs greater than 100 kW an option of standard rates which the state commission 
may review and, if necessary, disapprove prior to a FESA becoming final. 
Additionally, subsequent to the non-approval of Grouse Creek's FESAs, the Idaho PUC 
determined that the rates contained in Grouse Creek's FESAs were not reflective of Idaho 
Power's avoided cost, and consequently do not comport with the requirements of PURP A. Case 
No. GNR-E-11-03, Interlocutory Order No. 32498 at 2 (March 22, 2012). The Idaho PUC 
stated, "The methodologies previously approved by this Commission, as utilized by Idaho 
Power, do not currently produce rates that reflect Idaho Power's avoided costs and are not just 
and reasonable, nor in the public interest." Id. The requirement that the Idaho PUC finally 
review and approve or reject the FESAs entered into by Idaho Power and a PURP A QF is the 
Idaho PUC's mechanism that it utilizes to meet its obligation to assure not only that the 
agreements satisfy FERC's PURPA requirements, but also the state ofldaho's requirements, that 
such agreements are just and reasonable to utility customers and in the public interest. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824a-3(b)(l); Idaho Code §§ 61-502, 61-503. The Idaho PUC determined in two cases, 
independently of its legally enforceable obligation analysis, that Grouse Creek's FESAs are 
contrary to the public interest. First, in its final order denying approval of Grouse Creek's 
FESAs and, second, in its March 22, 2012, order finding the methodology employed to derive 
the rates in Grouse Creek's FESA to be unjust, unreasonable, contrary to PURP A, and not in the 
public interest. Case No. GNR-E-11-03, Interlocutory Order No. 32498, p. 2 (Mar. 22, 2012). 
The Idaho PUC acted pursuant to its discretion and obligations to protect the public 
interest of the state of Idaho by denying the Grouse Creek FESAs. Grouse Creek's requested 
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relief in its appeal to this Court is contrary to the public interest. This Court should affirm the 
final order of the Commission. 
VI. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Grouse Creek seeks an award of attorney fees citing as its sole basis Idaho Code § 12-
121. Appellant's Brief, pp. 41-43. "Attorney fees are not available under LC. §12-121 in an 
appeal from an order of the IPUC. . . ." Eagle Water Co., Inc. v. Idaho Public Utilities 
Commission, 130 Idaho 314, 318, 940 P.2d 1133, 1137 (1997). Accordingly, Grouse Creek's 
request for attorney fees in this appeal from an order of the Idaho PUC, should be denied 
outright. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The factual, "as-applied," determination of when a PURP A QF establishes the right to a 
particular avoided cost rate pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation in the state of Idaho is a 
determination that lies exclusively with the state authority, the Idaho PUC and this Court, and 
not with FERC, nor the federal courts. As such, the legality and reasonableness of the Idaho 
PUC's determination in Grouse Creek's case is a question proper for this Court's review, and not 
forFERC. 
The Commission and this Court have long recognized, and approved as consistent with 
state and federal law, the application in the state of Idaho of FERC requirements with regard to 
determining a QF's eligibility for a certain avoided cost rate pursuant to a legally enforceable 
obligation. The Idaho PUC has applied the legally enforceable obligation requirements, 
confirmed as valid and lawful by this Court, to the facts presented by Grouse Creek's proposed 
QF projects. The Commission found that Grouse Creek did not establish entitlement to the 
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avoided cost rates that were in effect for QFs prior to December 14, 2010, pursuant to the state of 
Idaho's implementation of PURPA. Further, the Commission found it to be contrary to the 
public interest of the people of the state of Idaho for Grouse Creek's proposed projects to receive 
the avoided cost rates in effect prior to December 14, 2010. 
The Idaho PUC's findings of fact are supported by substantial, competent evidence. The 
Commission regularly pursued its lawful authority in applying the regulatory scheme for the 
implementation of PURPA in the state of Idaho to Grouse Creek's proposed projects. 
Accordingly, the final order of the Idaho PUC should be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of April 2013. 
DONOVAN E. WALKER 
Attorney for Respondent-Intervenor Idaho Power 
Company 
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